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1. Introduction 
 
The disclosure of information has played a critical 
role in the efficient allocation of scarce resources in 
the capital markets. Therefore, the lack of disclosed 
information to stakeholders may hinder their ability to 
make rational decisions.  
Many studies have addressed the importance of 
information disclosure for stock market investors‘ 
decisions through capital market studies conducted in 
different countries and cross-country surveys of users 
(Barker, 1998; Bhushan and Lessard, 1992; Mangena 
and Tauringana, 2007).  
Various methods are used to convey information 
about a company‘s affairs to stakeholders among 
which are hard copy corporate annual reports, press 
releases and the Internet which has been used widely 
in recent years.  
The Internet is a unique disclosure information 
tool that disseminates information in many various 
techniques. Although the majority of Internet 
financial reporting (IFR) is still voluntary, many 
companies have begun to disclose information on 
their websites to attract a large number of the 
investors who seek more timeliness, and accurate and 
relevant information which is not provided by 
traditional disclosure methods (Ashbaugh et al., 1999; 
Debreceny et al., 2002; Ettredge et al., 2001). 
Many studies argue the potential effect of using 
the Internet in disclosing information and the 
determinants of disseminating this information on the 
companies‘ websites. Some of these studies 
investigate the online financial disclosure in general 
(Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Bonson and Escobar, 2002; 
Debreceny et al., 2002; Ettredge et al., 2001; Pervan, 
2006). However, other studies classify the online 
disclosure into more than one component. Debreceny 
et al., 2002, Marston and Polei, 2004 and Xiao et al., 
2004 classify the IFR into content and presentation, 
while Abdelsalam and Street (2007) use content and 
usability to measure IFR.  
Moreover, Bollen et al., (2006) investigate the 
quality of using the Internet for investor relationship 
activities. Although Spanos and Mylonakis (2006) 
check the content and presentation of IFR, they do not 
investigate the determinants of disclosing these 
components. Further, Pirchegger and Wagenhofer 
(1999) use four components to check the IFR, 
namely: content, timeliness, technology and user 
support. They investigate the relationship between 
IFR and size and ownership structure. The most 
recent study by Kelton and Yang (2008) classifies 
IFR into three components: content, presentation and 
corporate governance. 
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In this study, we examine the relationship 
between TOTAL, CONTENT and PRESENTATION 
of IFR and corporate governance characteristics. Our 
analysis is motivated by recent changes in the world 
environment in general and the Egyptian environment 
in particular.  
Regarding the changes in the world 
environment, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) requires 
that companies improve their disclosure quality and 
their transparency of financial reporting by applying 
new corporate governance restrictions (Kelton and 
Yang, 2008). This in turn will have an effect on the 
companies‘ IFR. Therefore, it can be hypothesised 
that corporate governance influences IFR. Companies 
improve their disclosure quality by both the content 
(supports a broader range of stakeholders in providing 
more accurate and timely information) and 
presentation (provides a new dissemination tool 
which is not provided by traditional paper based 
disclosure) of the IFR.  
In the Egyptian environment, many changes 
have happened in the last few years. These changes 
put pressure on Egyptian listed companies to improve 
their disclosure quality. Among these changes is the 
establishment of the Egyptian Institute of Directors 
(EIoD) in 2003 to spread awareness and to improve 
good corporate governance practices among Egyptian 
companies, financial institutions and other 
stakeholders who deal with these companies. This 
institute – in collaboration with the European Union 
and United Nations – has created the Egyptian Code 
of corporate governance of listed companies and 
issued its guidelines. According to this, we expect that 
corporate governance will have an effect on the 
Egyptian listed companies‘ IFR. 
Egyptian listed companies have some different 
characteristics from listed companies in advanced 
markets. Egyptian listed companies are more likely to 
be state-owned with a mixed ownership structure 
(totally state-owned, partially state-owned and 
privately owned). This mixture of ownership structure 
is due to the privatisation process that the Egyptian 
government has embraced since 1991 and is still in its 
agenda until now. As a result of the privatisation 
process, the proportion of institutional investors has 
increased. It can be expected that the nature of this 
ownership structure – especially for the institutional 
investor – has an impact on IFR. In addition, Egyptian 
listed companies‘ board of directors‘ membership 
consists of odd number with a minimum of three 
members. Those members are shareholders or 
representative of the participating companies except 
for two members who represent experts. Executives 
and non-executive members are not governed by any 
rules. Due to this board of directors‘ structure, it can 
be assumed that board of directors‘ membership has 
an influence on IFR. Final distinct form listed 
companies in advanced countries is related to the 
nature of auditing Egyptian listed companies. 
Egyptian listed companies are audited by two types of 
auditing company: public agency which is represented 
by the Central Auditing Agency (CAA) and is 
authorised to audit the state-owned companies only by 
law, and private companies that audit the other types 
of Egyptian listed companies. Some private 
companies are agents for international auditing 
companies. This mixture of auditing companies may 
have an impact on IFR. 
Based on these changes and characteristics, the 
study examines the IFR of the top 100 Egyptian listed 
companies at the end of 2006. In addition, it 
investigates the association between TOTAL, 
CONTENT and PRESENTATION of IFR and 
corporate governance and firm characteristics 
measures.         
Our results indicate that firm size and ownership 
diffusion are positively associated with all the IFR‘s 
three components (total, content and presentation). 
Profitability is positively associated with total and 
presentation of IFR. In addition, audit size is 
positively related to total and content, while 
institutional ownership is negatively related to them. 
Activity type is significantly related to total and 
content. Finally, we find that board size is positively 
related to the presentation of IFR. 
Few studies investigate the key determinants of 
IFR in developed countries. Similarly, many studies 
investigate the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and corporate governance characteristics. 
However, the impact of corporate governance on IFR 
still needs further investigation especially on the 
empirical side. 
With regard to the Egyptian context, we are not 
aware of any previous studies examining the 
relationship between IFR and corporate governance 
variables. Therefore, the main contribution of this 
study is to determine empirically, whether the 
corporate governance practices which have improved 
in the last few years in the Egyptian environment have 
an influence on a company‘s IFR. It aims to fill the 
gap in many areas of current literature. First, most 
prior studies examine the key determinants of IFR in 
developed countries. This study extends the previous 
studies by examining these determinants in an 
emerging market, namely Egypt. There is now 
increasing awareness that theories applied in the 
context of developed countries which explain 
voluntary disclosure may not be suitable in the 
context of emerging markets (Abdelsalam, 1999; 
Leventis, 2001). Consequently, there is a need to 
examine these theories in one of these emerging 
markets – Egypt – that is characterised by different 
political, economic, cultural, institutional, social and 
other factors, and explain the differences or 
similarities with the previous results in the developed 
countries context. 
Second, many prior studies investigate on the 
one hand the relationship between company 
characteristics and IFR and on the other hand the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
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corporate governance variables. However, in the 
literature there is a lack of examination of the 
relationship between IFR and corporate governance. 
This study extends the prior research by examining 
empirically the relationship between a company‘s IFR 
and corporate governance in Egypt. The Egyptian 
Exchange (EGX) is one of the emerging markets that 
has made great improvements in the last few years – 
as considered by many international bodies. These 
improvements attract more investors – especially 
foreign – to invest in this market to benefit from the 
economic reform programmes that reflect the 
enormous growth in the Egyptian economy generally 
and EGX specifically. This will require accurate and 
timely information for those investors, and this can be 
provided by the Internet, as well as greater control 
from the capital market authority (CMA) to protect 
their interests. Consequently, there is a need to test 
whether corporate governance variables have an 
impact on IFR which will help investors to obtain the 
financial information they require.            
Third, the study addresses the impact of 
corporate governance variables specific to the listed 
Egyptian companies that are distinct from listed 
companies in the advanced markets. These variables 
include boards of directors identified by Capital 
Market Law and mixed ownership structure identified 
by Central Depository Law and the Capital Market 
Law. Most listed Egyptian companies are state-owned 
companies. As a result of a privatisation programme 
undertaken by the Egyptian government, some 
companies have a mixed ownership. Companies that 
are totally privatised become privately-owned 
companies either by institutions or individuals, 
whereas companies that are partially privatised are 
state- and privately-owned. The proportion of 
institutional investors has increased as a result of the 
continuing privatisation programme and this has a 
considerable effect on the Egyptian economy. 
Although liquidity in the Egyptian market is still 
dominated by retail investors, in 2007 institutional 
investors witnessed an increasing activity, accounting 
for 45% of the total value traded, up from 40% in 
2006 (EGX, 2007). From another perspective, 2007 
witnessed a rising penetration of new foreign 
institutions into the Egyptian market with a large 
amount of investments, whereby total foreigners 
(Arab and foreigners) ended the year as net buyers, 
recording a net inflow of LE 8 billion, compared to 
LE 5.2 billion in 2006  (ibid). While studies have 
examined the effect of ownership structure on IFR 
(Pirchegger and Wagenhofer, 1999; Oyelere et al. 
2003; Marston and Polei, 2004; Bollen et al, 2006; 
Abdelsalam et al. 2007), few studies focus on the 
impact of institutional investors on IFR (Xioa et al., 
2004). This study will extend the previous studies to 
test the impact of institutional investors in the listed 
Egyptian companies on IFR.     
Another distinction from listed companies in the 
advanced markets is the nature of listed Egyptian 
companies‘ boards of directors. Company laws 
determine the level of board members‘ disclosure. 
The board of directors‘ membership consists of an 
odd number with a minimum of three members. Until 
now, no rules have governed the board structure 
regarding executive or non-executive managers; the 
board chairman is often also the managing director. 
All board members are shareholders or representatives 
of the participating companies. However, only two 
members apart from this are chosen as experts 
(Fawzy, 2003). The names of the board members and 
their remuneration are disclosed to the annual general 
assembly, but such information is not published in the 
annual report. A list of names and nationalities of 
companies‘ board members and managers is required 
by the CMA which must be informed immediately of 
any changes to this list (ibid). Any conflict of interest 
should be disclosed by a board member who should 
avoid voting on any board decision related to those 
conflicts.  
The annual general assembly elects board 
members for a period of three renewable years and 
decides their remuneration. Similarly, the board 
chairman and his deputy are elected by the appointed 
board members who have the right to change them at 
any time. The board holds its meetings at the request 
of its chairperson or two-thirds of its members. Many 
studies examine the impact of the board of directors 
on voluntary disclosure (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). However, we are not 
aware that there is any study examining the impact of 
board size on IFR. This study will fill the gap on this 
issue and examine the impact of listed Egyptian 
boards of directors on IFR. 
In the following section, we briefly present the 
Egyptian environment and corporate governance 
system in Egypt. After that, we review relevant 
literature of IFR and formulate the hypotheses. Then, 
we follow this with sections on sample data analysis 
and results, and finally present the conclusions, 
limitations and recommendations for future research.       
     
2. The Egyptian environment: A brief 
overview  
 
Egypt is one of the most populous Arabian, North 
African and Middle East countries. Many steps have 
been taken by the Egyptian government to improve 
the national economy among which is the economic 
reform and privatisation programme applied in 1991 
to increase the role of the private sector in the 
economic development. In 2006/07, GDP growth in 
Egypt averaged about 7%, and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows increased twelve-fold 
between 2001 and 2006 (OCED, 2007) reaching their 
highest levels in 2007/08 (13.2 billion USD), ranking 
Egypt the top FDI recipient in Africa (OCED/AFDB, 
2008). In addition, the Fitch Rating has raised Egypt‘s 
BB+ credit rating from stable to positive (EGX, 
2007). Moreover, in July 2007, Egypt became the 
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40th country to adhere to the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Declaration on International Investment and 
Multinational Enterprises which indicates the recent 
progress on policy reform. As a result of the 
continuing efforts that are performed by the Egyptian 
government to reform the business environment, the 
World Bank ranks Egypt as one of the fast-reforming 
countries in 2007/08 (ibid). 
The Egyptian government is aware that 
sustaining such a reform programme relies on the 
existence of a strong financial regulatory framework, 
the availability of credible corporate information, and 
the adoption of internationally accepted accounting 
and auditing standards (World Bank, 2002). 
Consequently, the Egyptian government launched 
several plans to improve financial reporting and 
disclosure requirements, as well as accounting and 
auditing standards and practices (World Bank, 2002).       
CMA is the market regulatory agency that 
organises and secures the market for investors in 
EGYPT and is responsible for emphasising market 
transparency by monitoring compliance with 
disclosure rules of all listed companies. According to 
Capital Market Law (CML) 95 of 1992, each listed 
Egyptian company should provide copies of their 
annual and semi-annual financial statements to both 
CMA and the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) (Hassan et 
al. 2009). Recently, CMA forced listed companies to 
disclose information on a quarterly basis and to 
disclose any information about a transaction done by 
an insider and of any extraordinary event that might 
affect the company's status to improve disclosure and 
transparency1. The two professional accounting 
bodies are the Syndicate of Commercial Professions 
(SOCP) and the Egyptian Society of Accounting and 
Auditors (ESAA). Egyptian companies apply 
Egyptian Accounting Standards (EAS) which were 
issued by Ministerial Decree 503/1997 in preparing 
their financial statements. EAS have been replaced by 
a new version of EAS that was issued by Ministerial 
Decree 243/2006. The new EAS are compatible with 
International Accounting Standards (IAS)2.   
One of the most noticeable improvements is 
related to The Egyptian Exchange which represents 
one of the oldest stock markets in the Middle East 
with a history that dates back to the late 1800s 
(Mecagni and Sourial, 1999). The Egyptian Exchange 
(EGX) has two entities: the Alexandria Stock 
Exchange established in 1888 and the Cairo Stock 
Exchange established in 1903. Both Exchanges have 
the same chairman and their boards of directors are 
60% elected from brokerage and market participants, 
                                                 
1 Listing and delisting rule (article 20). 
http://www.egyptse.com/index_a.asp?CurPage=rules_regul
ations_a.html 
2 Any accounting practices not covered in EAS, IAS should 
be applied. For more details: 
http://www.cma.gov.eg/cma/content/english/accounting_crit
eria_en/accounting_criteria_en.htm 
whereas the remaining 40% are government 
appointed (Abdel-Shahid, 2004). Furthermore, the 
Alexandria stock market has been the fifth longest 
established in the world after those of Inverness 
(1536), Amsterdam (1608), London (1666), and Paris 
(1808) (Egyptian Capital Market Authority 1996 as 
cited in Omran, 1999). Currently, the EGX is the 
world‘s best performing emerging markets exchange, 
driven by Egypt‘s impressive economic growth in 
2004 and 2005 (ICC, 2006). 
During 2006/2007, the government continued its 
efforts to improve the legislative and structural 
environment of the stock exchange, to enhance the 
disclosure and transparency on one hand, and protect 
investors‘ rights on the other. In this context, the 
Minister of Investment issued Decree no 314 for 2006 
to raise the requirements of minimum issued and 
paid-in capital of securities brokerage companies in 
order to strengthen their solvency and ensure their 
financial soundness (Central Bank of Egypt, 2006-
2007, P.44). Moreover, EGX launched in 2007 for the 
first time its sector indices, ranking the different 
sectors of the Egyptian market and helping investors 
make better-informed investment decisions (EGX, 
2007). As a result of all these steps undertaken by the 
EGX and also the economic reform steps applied by 
the government, the amount of privatisation 
programmes increased to LE 48.9 billion by the end 
of December 2007, and the market capitalisation grew 
remarkably from 5 billion LE in 1990 to 768 billion 
LE by the end of June 2007 with 105% of GDP. In 
addition, the trading value surged to LE 363 billion 
with an increase of 26% from 2006 (ibid). Moreover, 
the trading volume increased by 66% from 2006 
(UNCTAD, 2008). Noteworthy is that foreign 
purchases increased dramatically in 2007, recording 
LE 100 billion, up from LE 91 billion in 2006. The 
United Kingdom represents the highest foreign 
purchases in 2007, followed by USA and Saudi 
Arabia (ibid). This in turn reflects the confidence in 
the EGX and its importance as an emerging market.  
 
3. Corporate governance system in 
Egypt 
 
Another side of reforms is related to corporate 
governance practices. Good practices of corporate 
governance disclosure increase the confidence of 
investors in the economy of the country, deepen 
capital markets and increase the ability of countries to 
mobilise savings and raise investment rates (Dahawy, 
2007). In addition, widely used corporate governance 
disclosure enables companies to have large number of 
investors, as corporate governance protects the 
interest of minority shareholders. As Egypt seeks to 
attract more foreign investments to its capital market, 
it is urgent that Egyptian companies apply the 
principals of corporate governance. Some studies 
argue that corporate governance has become an 
important issue in Egypt in recent years due to the 
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integration of the Egyptian economy with the global 
economy, internationalisation of capital markets and 
the increasingly important role played by the private 
sector in the economy (Rawy, 2004; Abdel  Shahid, 
2001). In addition, PCSU (2000) demonstrates that 
there are four separate but highly related factors that 
could lead to better corporate governance in Egypt. 
These factors are: the importance of a strong, clear 
and well-enforced legal framework, the adequacy of 
greater information disclosure that leading to greater 
transparency, the independency of managers and the 
monitoring of external factors (PCSU, 2000).  
The legal framework that impacts on the 
concepts of corporate governance in Egypt can be 
classified into two major groups: laws that govern the 
incorporation of companies in Egypt and laws that 
govern the listed companies in EGX (Dahawy, 2007). 
The first group of laws include: Companies‘ law 
no.59 for 1981 which regulates joint stock, limited 
liability and partnerships limited by shares companies, 
Public business sector law no. 203 for 1991 that deals 
with the public sector companies and Investment law 
no.8 for 1997 that organises investment in specific 
industrial locations. The second group of laws 
include: Capital market law no. 95 for 1992 which 
regulates the Egyptian financial market, and Central 
depository law no. 93 for 2000 which regulates all 
registration, clearance and settlement procedures 
associated with trading transactions.            
Egypt has received more attention in terms of 
evaluating the compliance of Egyptian corporations 
with international corporate governance principles 
such as the principles issued by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
Therefore, the World Bank, jointly with the (OECD), 
completed a survey for the first time in the Middle 
East in 2001.This survey which assesses the 
application of corporate governance standards on the 
Egyptian Capital Market and the Egyptian economy 
finds that 62% of the principles were applied by the 
sampled Egyptian companies. The survey was last 
updated in March 2004 and finds that 82% of the 
studied companies were applying OECD principles, 
which reflects the improvement in applying corporate 
governance principles in Egypt. 
Recognising the importance of the role played 
by corporate governance, the EGX has formed the 
Exchange‘s Investor Relations and Corporate 
Governance Committee, which is made up of 
representatives from ten EGX-listed companies. 
These companies are the best with regard to 
disclosure procedures and act as the blue chip 
companies to their peers. The Committee plays a 
communications and advisory role, and also sponsors 
events and publications (ICC, 2006). 
The Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIoD) has 
been established as the first institute focusing on 
corporate governance in the Arab region. It aims to 
spread awareness and improve corporate governance 
practices in Egypt, the Middle East, and North Africa. 
Two major codes are published by EIoD with the 
support of the World Bank and the IFC. The first, in 
October 2005, was the Egyptian code of corporate 
governance for the private sector; the second, in July 
2006, was the Egyptian code of corporate governance 
for state-owned enterprises. These codes present a 
comprehensive set of corporate governance principles 
which define rules and procedures that achieve the 
optimum protection and balance between the interests 
of directors, shareholders, and stakeholders.  
Furthermore, the CMA in 2006 sought to 
enhance the performance of corporate governance in 
Egyptian companies by improving the level of quality 
in the auditing profession. The CMA constitutes an 
auditors registry which include the auditors who will 
only be permitted to audit the listed companies in the 
EGX. In addition, in 2007, the CMA issued a new 
code of ethics for auditors in Egypt. The code of 
ethics discusses and explains the rules and regulations 
for important issues, such as: independence of 
auditors, objectivity, competence, secrecy, and 
professional conduct (Dahawy and Conover 2007). 
Moreover, the new listing rules stipulated by 
EGX add another restriction on Egyptian 
corporations, i.e. to apply the principals of corporate 
governance. EGX specify that all the listed companies 
should notify in detail all the issues that relate to 
corporate governance disclosure3. 
Generally, the governance system can be 
categorised into two main groups: market governance 
system and blockholder governance system. The 
market governance system (e.g. USA and UK) is 
characterised by dispersed equity holding and 
separation between ownership and control which raise 
the agency problem that results from a conflict of 
interest between strong management and weak 
dispersed shareholders. On the other hand, in the 
blockholder governance system (e.g. Europe and 
Japan) there is no separation between management 
and control and the majority of stocks are held by one, 
two or a small group of large investors. The agency 
problem results from the conflict between strong 
                                                 
3 For more details: EGX, listing rules 203 Cairo and 
Alexandria stock exchange site. 
Listing rules include the requirement of the corporate 
governance requirements (Articles 12-19), the requirement 
of preparation and presentation financial statements 
(Articles 22-30) and the standard for delisting role (Articles 
34-35) which force the listed Egyptian companies to 
commit to corporate governance requirements.   
Article (4) forces companies to disclose about: companies‘ 
board of directors, business contracts between the company 
and its directors, management , shareholders and related 
parties, companies‘ organisational structure, percentage 
details of shareholders‘ composition, all transactions 
between the company and any of its shareholders, the 
existence of an audit committee and the internal procedures 
and regulations undertaken by the company to prevent a 
director or another insider from purchasing or selling 
securities of the company based on insider information. 
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majority shareholders and weak minority shareholders 
(Bratton and McCahery, 2002) 
In the Egyptian context, the blockholder 
governance system is dominant. Most of the 
controlling shareholders are individuals and dominant 
institutions (Sourial, 2004). Consequently, controlling 
shareholders have strong incentives to closely monitor 
the company and its management which may have a 
significant impact on the governance of the company 
as well as the disclosed information. 
Currently, some studies discuss the main 
characteristics of the Egyptian listed companies. 
Fawzy (2003) mentions that most listed Egyptian 
companies are closely held, have a state ownership in 
privatised companies and have weak board 
independence. Bremer and Ellias (2007) demonstrate 
that listed Egyptian companies have some features 
that may hinder the development of corporate 
governance in Egypt. They point out that closely held 
companies are the dominant type in the Egyptian 
private sector, state owned companies have a key role 
in the Egyptian economy and there is a lack of 
recognition of the concepts and benefits of corporate 
governance practices as well as a lack of board 
independence.    
 
4. Literature review and hypotheses’ 
formulation 
4.1 Literature review 
 
Many studies investigate the potential effect of using 
the Internet for disclosing information on corporate 
websites. Some of these studies are descriptive, 
examining the extent of the website and the type of 
the information disclosed either in one country or 
across countries. Appendix 1 summarises these 
studies. 
The percentages of companies that have 
websites in these studies are between 43 and 100; of 
these companies 33% to 95% disclose financial 
information. Some of these studies find presentation 
items. However, all these items are concerned only 
with the type of format (PDF, HTML and others).       
The other type of IFR studies is empirical, which 
investigates the relationship between the IFR and its 
determinants. Most of these studies use a checklist to 
measure the dependent variable which varies from 
one study to another. Some studies examine only the 
presence of a website and whether or not the 
companies disclose financial information on their 
websites (Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Craven and Marston, 
1999; Marston, 2003; Marston and Leow, 1998). On 
the other hand, some studies measure the dependent 
variable as a dummy variable rather than calculating a 
disclosure index from a checklist (Brennan and 
Hourigan, 2000; Ismail, 2002; Oyelere et al., 2003). 
According to the studies that use a checklist, some of 
them weight their items (Debreceny et al., 2002; 
Larran and Giner, 2002; Marston and Polei, 2004; 
Pirchegger and Wagenhofer, 1999). Furthermore, two 
studies Xiao et al., (2004) and Bollen et al., (2006) 
use a mixture of weighted and un-weighted 
approaches, while the majority of the studies use the 
un-weighted approach (Abdelsalam et al., 2007; 
Allam and Lymer, 2003; Bonson and Escobar, 2002; 
Ettredge et al., 2002; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Pervan, 
2006; Sriram and Laksmana, 2006; Trabelsi and 
Labelle, 2006).The sample of these studies ranges 
from 660 companies (Debreceny et al., 2002) to 50 
companies (Marston and Polei, 2004).  
Many studies provide a theoretical framework 
for their analysis by using theories of voluntary 
disclosure to generate their hypotheses (Ettredge et 
al., 2002; Larran and Giner, 2002; Marston, 2003; 
Marston and Leow, 1998; Marston and Polei, 2004; 
Xiao et al., 2004), while some studies have not used a 
framework (Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Brennan and 
Hourigan, 2000; Pirchegger and Wagenhofer, 1999; 
Sriram and Laksmana, 2006). Moreover, some studies 
classify the IFR into content and presentation 
(Debreceny et al., 2002; Kelton and Yang, 2008; 
Marston and Polei, 2004; Xiao et al., 2004), while 
other studies use another classification: content, 
timeliness, technology and usability (Abdelsalam et 
al., 2007; Allam and Lymer, 2003; Pirchegger and 
Wagenhofer, 1999).  
Finally, most of the studies investigate the 
disclosure of financial information on the companies‘ 
websites (Craven and Marston, 1999; Ettredge et al., 
2001, 2002; Marston, 2003; Marston and Leow, 
1998), while there are some studies investigating 
financial information as well as social information 
and corporate governance information (Abdelsalam et 
al., 2007; Kelton and Yang, 2008; Marston and Polei, 
2004; Oyelere et al., 2003; Xiao et al., 2004). A 
summary of these studies is presented in table 1. 
It can be seen that most of the studies investigate 
the relationship between company characteristics and 
IFR. Few studies focus on the impact of corporate 
governance on IFR. (Xiao et al., 2004) carried out a 
survey of the adoption of internet-based financial 
reporting of the 300 largest Chinese companies in 
2001. They develop a disclosure index of 82 items (58 
related to the content of either China Securities 
Regulatory Commission –CSRC – required items or 
NON-CSRC required items and 24 to presentation 
format). The study classifies the internet corporate 
disclosure into five components: total score, content, 
format, CSRC and NON-CSRC. Therefore, five 
models are used to examine the relationship between 
the extent of Internet corporate disclosure and ten 
explanatory variables. Regarding governance factors, 
the study reveals that there is a positive effect due to 
legal person ownership, a negative effect of state 
shared ownership and no effect of ownership by 
individual shareholders and composition of the board 
of directors on Internet corporate disclosure. 
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Table 1. Overview of the empirical studies 
Author Sample % corporate 
web site  
% disclosed 
financial data  
No. of 
checklist 
Items  
Dependent Variable  Independent Variables 
Marston and 
Leow, 1998,   
UK 
FTSE 100  63 45 2  
UW 
x Presence of website 
x Disclosure of financial 
information 
Size (+) 
Type of sector (N.S.) 
Ashbaugh et al., 
1999, USA 
 
290 87 70 3 
UW 
x Comprehensive set of 
financial statements 
x Link to annual report 
x Link to EDGAR 
Size (+) 
Profitability(+) 
Rating  (+) 
Shares held by investors. (N.S.) 
Craven and 
Marston, 1999,  
UK 
 Top 206  74 53 2 
UW 
x Presence of website 
x Disclosure of financial 
information 
Size (+) 
Type of sector (N.S.) 
Pirchegger and 
Wagenhofer, 
1999, Austrian 
German 
 
 
32 (97/98) 
30  
 
72 (Aus 97)  
88(Aus 98) 
100 (Germ) 
 
91 (Aus 97)  
96(Aus 98) 
97 (Germ) 
38 
W 
x Content (7) 
x Timeliness (5) 
x Technology (14) 
x User support (12) 
Size (+) 
Ownership structure (+) 
(For Austrian comp. Only) 
Brennan and 
Hourigan, 2000, 
Ireland 
 
94 listed 
Comp. 
15 Public 
Comp. 
37(listed) 
100(public) 
69(listed) 
53(public) 
8 
N/A 
x Presence of website 
x Disclosure of financial 
information 
 
Size (+)  
Leverage (N.S.) 
Type of sector ( + service) 
Demand for information  (+)     
Ettredge et al., 
2002,  USA 
220  88 Not 
mentioned 
17 
UW 
x Financial information 
items 
 
 
x Voluntary disclosure 
items  
 
 
x Index (the total of both 
variables) 
Size (+) (for all) 
Information asymmetry(-) (for 
all) 
Firm performance (N.S) (for all)  
Capital market access (+) (for 
voluntary) 
Disclosure quality (+) (for 
voluntary) 
Bonson and  
Escobar, 2002,  
European Union 
countries 
Biggest 300 
 
100 100 23 
UW 
x Disclosure of financial 
information (content) 
Size (+) 
Industry type (+) (industry) 
Countries‘ culture (+) 
Debreceny et al., 
2002, 22 
Different 
countries 
660  62 51 2 
W 
x Content  
 
x Presentation 
Size (+) (for both) 
Foreign listing (N.S. for 
content) , (- for presentation)  
USA listing (+) (for both) 
Level of technology (N.S. for 
content) , (+ for presentation) 
Growth (- for content), (N.S. for 
presentation) 
Systematic risk (N.S.) (for both) 
Leverage (N.S.) (for both) 
Environmental factors (N.S. for 
content) , (+ for presentation) 
Ismail, 2002,  
Qatar  
Bahrain  
Saudi Arabia 
 
24  
36  
68  
39 47(Bahrain) 
41(Saudi 
Arabia) 
21 (Qatar) 
N/A x Disclosure of financial 
information 
Size (+) 
Profitability(+) 
Leverage (+) 
Industry type (+) 
Countries‘ culture (+) 
Based on the interaction 
between the variables. 
Larren & Giner, 
2002, Spain 
144 Listed 
Comp. 
74 51 15 
W 
x Disclosure of   financial 
information 
Size (+) 
Leverage (N.S.) 
Profitability (N.S.) 
Foreign listing (N.S.) 
Type of sector (N.S.) 
Firm growth (N.S.) 
Allam and 
Lymer, 2003, 
(USA,UK, 
Canada, 
Australia, and 
Hong Kong ) 
250  
 
All 
countries 
100 
Hong Kong 
98 
100 36 
UW 
x General attributes (12) 
x Financial information 
attributes (24) 
Size (+) (only Australia) 
Countries‘ culture (+) 
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Oyelere et al., 
2003,  New 
Zealand 
229 listed  
Comp.  
54 73 7 
N/A 
x Companies providing 
financial 
 reports on the Internet 
(IFRC)  
 
x Companies not 
providing financial 
 reports on the  Internet 
(N-IFRC)  
 
Size (+) 
Profitability (N.S.) 
Liquidity (+) 
Internationalisation (N.S.) 
Ownership Structure (+) 
Type of sector (+) (Industry) 
Leverage (N.S.) 
Marston, 2003, 
Japan  
Top 99  
 
92 69 13 
UW 
x Presence of website 
x Disclosure of financial 
information 
Size (+) 
Type of sector (+) 
Profitability (N.S.) 
Foreign listing (N.S.) 
Xiao et al., 2004, 
China 
Top 300  
Listed 
Comp. 
68 Not 
mentioned 
82 
W and 
UW 
x Content (58) 
 
x Presentation (24) 
 
x Total (82) 
Size (+) 
Profitability (N.S.) 
Leverage(+) 
Capital market access (N.S.) 
Fixed assets (N.S.) 
Independent directors  (N.S.) 
Audit quality (N.S.) 
Foreign ownership (N.S.) 
Type of sector (+) (IT) 
state share ownership (-) 
legal person ownership (+) 
Marston and 
Polei, 2004, 
Germany  
Top& 
Bottom 50  
100 99 53(2000) 
81(2003) 
W 
x Total IFR 
 
x Content 
 
x Presentation 
Size (+) (2000,2003) 
Ownership structure (+) (2000) 
Profitability (N.S.) 
Foreign listing (+) (2003) 
Systematic risk (N.S.) 
Sriram and 
Laksmana, 2006, 
USA 
212  Not 
mentioned 
Not 
mentioned 
26 
UW 
x Financial and Non-
financial Data (DS1) 
x Management‘s analysis 
of financial and non-
financial data (DS2) 
x Forward-looking 
information (DS3) 
x Information about 
employees, directors, and 
management (DS4) 
x Information on company 
background, objectives, 
strategies, and industry 
x structures (DS5) 
x Total DSCORE 
Size (+) 
(DSCORE,DS1,DS2,DS5) 
High technology (+) 
(DSCORE,DS4,DS5) 
Firm performance (+) (DS3) 
Investor institute (-) 
(DSCORE,DS1) 
Issuance of shares (+) (DS2) 
Pervan, 2006 , 
Croatia 
Slovenia 
 
55  
30  
 
 
Not 
mentioned 
Not 
mentioned 
30 
UW 
 
 
x Financial       
information 
x Other useful    
information 
 
x Transparency of 
management and 
supervisory boards 
x User support 
Size (+ for Croatia), (N.S. for 
Slovenia) 
Profitability (+ for Croatia), 
(N.S. for Slovenia) 
Ownership structure (+ for 
Croatia), (N.S. for Slovenia) 
Foreign ownership (+ for 
Croatia), (N.S. for Slovenia) 
Market activity (+) (for both) 
Industry type (-) (for Croatia,  
tourism and marine transport)  
(For Slovenia, transport) 
Trabelsi and 
Labelle, 2006, 
Canada 
118  listed 
Comp.  
96 91 7 
UW 
x Discloses additional 
financial information on 
the web site. 
x The extent of financial 
disclosure on the Internet 
 
Investors‘ demand (+) 
Ownership structure (N.S.) 
Complexity of TFR (+) 
Firm  performance (+) 
Shares Issue (N.S.) 
Cross listed firms (N.S.) 
Competition (N.S.) 
Risk of litigation (+) 
Audit quality (N.S.) 
Type of sector (N.S.) 
Bollen et al., 
2006 
Australia, 
Belgium, 
France, 
Netherlands, 
270 listed 
Comp.  
99 90 29 
W and 
UW 
x The quality of the 
investor relation website  
(this measured by) 
Annual and interim 
reports on the Internet (9) 
x Press releases and 
Size (+) 
Internationalisation (+) 
Ownership structure (+) 
Leverage (N.S.) 
Company performance (N.S.) 
Level of technology(-) 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 4, Summer 2010, Continued - 4 
 
 405 
 Note: summary of the empirical studies from 1998 to 2008, W: weighted checklist, UW: un-weighted checklist, 
N/A: the study did not use a checklist, +: significant positive relationship, -: significant negative relationship, 
N.S.: no significant relationship. 
 
Abdelsalam et al. (2007) examine the 
relationship between the comprehensive CIR 
disclosure by 110 London-listed companies in mid-
2005 and corporate governance measures. The study 
utilises an un-weighted disclosure index derived from 
143 checklist items that contain general content, 
credibility and usability items. After controlling for 
size, profitability, industry and high 
growth/intangibles, four ordinary least square 
regressions using rank transformation and normal 
score are estimated to test the study‘s hypotheses. 
Generally, only the number of analysts following the 
company is positively associated with the four 
measures of CIR disclosure. More specifically, many 
results related to governance factors are found 
according to the classification of CIR disclosure. 
Director independence is positively related to CIR 
comprehensive and general content. Moreover, 
director holding associates negatively with CIR 
comprehensive, general content and usability. 
Similarly, role duality decreases the credibility of 
CIR. 
Additionally, the importance of examining the 
effect of corporate governance on IFR is also evident 
in Kelton and Yang‘s, (2008) study in which they 
survey 284 companies listed on NASDAQ national 
market in 2004. To measure the IFR, an un-weighted 
checklist of 36 items grouped into content (24 items) 
and presentation (12 items) is developed. Corporate 
governance is measured by shareholder rights, 
ownership structure, board composition and audit 
committee variables. Based on seven control variables 
(size, profitability, growth opportunities, need for new 
external equity capital, information asymmetry, 
auditor type and industry), a separate Poisson 
regression model was conducted to test the postulated 
South Africa and 
the UK 
further information 
services on the Internet (6) 
x Presentation (7) 
x Direct contact (4) 
x Video/audio recordings 
and online participation in 
meetings (3) 
Growth (-) 
Disclosure environment (+) 
Abdelsalam et 
al., 2007, UK 
Top 110  
listed 
Comp. 
100 Not 
mentioned 
143 
UW 
x Content (74)  
x Usability (69) 
x Comprehensive index 
(143) 
x Content (74) classified 
into two groups:  
General content (19) 
Credibility (55) 
Size (+) (only credibility) 
Ownership structure (N.S. (for 
all) 
Director holding (-) (for 
comprehensive, General Con 
and Usability) 
Independent director (+) (for 
comprehensive and general 
Content) 
Role duality (-) (only for 
credibility) 
Analyst following (+) (for all) 
Industry type (+) 
(comprehensive and general 
content) 
Level of technology (-) (general 
content and usability) 
Profitability (N.S.) (for all) 
Kelton & Yang, 
2008, USA 
284  Not 
mentioned 
Not 
mentioned 
36 
UW 
x Content (20) 
x Corporate governance 
(4) 
x Presentation (12) 
x Total index (36) 
Shareholder right (+) (for Cont, 
C.G. and total)  
Managerial ownership (N.S.) 
(for all) 
Block ownership (-) (for pres, 
cont and total) 
Independent directors (+) (for 
all) 
Role duality (N.S.) (for all) 
Audit committee financial 
expertise (+) (for  Cont, C.G. 
and total) 
Audit committee meeting 
frequently (+) (for all) 
Size (+) (for all) 
Profitability (N.S.) (for all) 
Firm growth (-) (for C.G. only) 
Shares issue (-) (for C.G. only) 
Information asymmetry (+) (for 
Cont, C.G. and total) 
Audit type (+) (for Cont, C.G. 
and total)  
Industry type 
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hypotheses for each of the measures of IFR (total, 
content, presentation and corporate governance). 
Overall, large companies with a higher percentage of 
independent directors and more auditing committee 
meetings are more engaging in IFR. The findings 
reveal that the association between IFR and corporate 
governance varies according to a company‘s size. The 
study concludes that corporate governance 
mechanisms influence the transparency of company‘s 
disclosure. 
However, few studies have examined IFR in 
Egypt. These studies are mainly descriptive and only 
two studies are empirical. Metwaly (2003) examines 
the top 140 companies in 2001. He finds that only 
32.8% of the sampled companies have websites and 
25.9% of those companies disclose financial 
information on them. 
Mohamed (2002) compares the most active 
companies in three countries; Egypt (50 companies), 
Saudi Arabia (43) and Kuwait (12) in 2002. The study 
concludes that 48% of the Egyptian companies have 
websites but of these only 18% disclose financial 
information. 
El-Dyasty (2004) also compares the top 100 
listed companies in Egypt and the US in 2002. The 
study states that 55% of the sampled companies have 
websites but only 4% of those companies disclose 
financial information. 
Tawfiq (2001) investigates the relationship 
between IFR and its determinants for 58 Egyptian 
banks at the end of 2000. He finds that 33% of the 
sampled banks have websites but only 26% disclose 
financial information. The study uses logistic 
regression instead of checklists to measure the 
dependent variables. The size and ownership structure 
are the only variables that determine the need for IFR 
in the sampled banks. 
Ragab (2005) examines the extent of IFR and 
the explanatory factors that determine the application 
of IFR for the Egyptian listed companies (866) at the 
end of 2004. Only 30.4% of the companies have 
websites and 16.3% disclose financial information. 
The study utilises a weighted checklist to measure 
IFR; this checklist contains 35 items classified into: 
mandatory information, voluntary information and 
technology items. Ten firm characteristics variables 
are tested by the multiple regression analysis to 
investigate their influence on IFR. The study 
concludes that private sector companies and the 
importance of online disclosure are the only variables 
that are significantly associated with both the 
mandatory and voluntary information disclosure, 
while size is significantly related to mandatory 
information disclosure, and both information 
asymmetry and stock activity are significantly related 
to voluntary information disclosure. 
We can conclude from the above studies that 
there is a lack of IFR studies in the Egyptian 
environment. In addition, there is a need for studies 
that aim to investigate the impact of corporate 
governance variables on IFR. This study tries to fill 
the gap in this area.    
 
4.2 Hypotheses development  
 
The main objectives of this study are: 1) examine the 
current situation of IFR in the Egyptian environment, 
and 2) investigate the relationship between IFR and 
firm characteristics, ownership structures and 
corporate governance. Each variable will be discussed 
below.    
 
4.2.1 Ownership diffusion     
Ownership diffusion refers to the dispersion and 
separation of ownership between managers and equity 
owners as a group (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
According to agency theory, companies whose 
ownership structure tends to be diffused (widely held 
companies) intensively seek to reduce the conflicts 
between the shareholders (generally small) and 
management, which arise as a result of diversity in 
interests, by disclosing more information which may 
assist the shareholder in monitoring the behaviour of 
management. Therefore, the Internet will be a 
valuable source of disseminating information to the 
various numbers of investors who diffuse in widely 
range. This is confirmed by (Marston and Polei, 2004) 
who mention that widely held companies will tend to 
disclose more information on their websites to supply 
shareholders with necessary information.  
Many studies test the relationship between 
ownership diffusion and IFR. Pervan (2006) and 
Trabelsi and Labelle (2006) find that there is an 
insignificant relationship between ownership 
diffusion and IFR. While, on the other hand, 
Debreceny and Rahman, 2005, Marston and Polei, 
(2004) and Oyelere et al., (2003) prove a significant 
relationship.  
The ownership structure of the listed Egyptian 
companies consists of five groups; 
publicly/government owned, privately owned, 
employee owned, managerial owned and free float. 
Publicly/government owned structure includes 
holding companies, public bank and insurance, public 
mutual funds and other public institutions. Privately 
owned structure includes private banks and insurance, 
private mutual funds and other private institutions. 
Employee owned structure includes employee 
shareholders‘ association. Managerial owned structure 
includes management and founders.  Free float 
structure includes private or individual investors. 
Based on the prior studies, we expect to find a 
significant relationship between ownership structure 
and IFR. To test this relationship, we assume that: 
H1:  There is a positive relationship between 
ownership diffusion and the IFR.  
 
4.2.2 Institutional ownership 
Different shareholders have different interests which 
may influence decisions relating to the companies and 
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also require different monitoring capabilities. Most of 
the Egyptian companies‘ ownership structure contains 
a representative from institutions. According to the 
agency theory, the existence of institutions alleviates 
the conflict between shareholders and management as 
they tend to encourage companies to disclose more 
information to reduce information asymmetry. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) argue that 
information asymmetry will be reduced by increasing 
the level of public disclosure and this situation is 
expected by the investment funds. 
Regarding the relationship between this variable 
and disclosure, the results are contradictory. 
Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) find that institutional 
ownership is negatively associated with the interim 
disclosure of Finnish companies. El-Gazzar (1998) 
concludes that large institutional ownership may 
encourage firms to increase their voluntary disclosure.  
Institutions ownership could be sensitive to a 
company‘s disclosure for many reasons (Bushee and 
Noe, 1999). First, if disclosure reduces the price 
impact of traders (Healy et al., 1999), the information 
asymmetry which arises from agency cost will be 
minimised between the companies and their 
institutions;  second, if disclosure influences the 
potential for profitable trading opportunities; and 
finally, if corporate governance activities are 
influenced by public disclosure. 
In Egypt, the percentage of institutional has 
ownership increased over the last few years. One of 
the reasons for this increase is that large privatisation 
deals were mainly conducted by institutions (Abdel 
Shahid, 2003). Several major Egyptian private 
investor groups have acquired substantial equity in a 
number of privatised companies (PCSU, 2002). The 
ownership structure of listed Egyptian companies is 
characterised by mixed ownership which is comprised 
of government, institutional, employees and 
individual investors. Due to the acceleration of the 
privatisation process in the last few years, it can be 
expected that institutional investors will increase their 
proportion in listed Egyptian companies.   
Therefore, we extend previous studies that 
examine the relationship between institutional 
investors and voluntary disclosure, to test the impact 
of institutional investors on IFR for listed Egyptian 
companies. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find a negative 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
institutional investors. However, this relationship is 
not significant. 
The following hypothesis tests the relationship 
between institutional ownership and the IFR: 
H2:  There is a relationship between 
institutional ownership and the IFR. 
 
4.2.3 Board Size  
―At the heart of every governance system is a board 
(or boards) of corporate directors, charged with 
directing and overseeing corporate affairs‖ Marek 
Hessel, (2006). An effective board of directors is 
considered to be an effective internal corporate 
governance device when external devices such as 
legal environment, enforcement, and market 
discipline are not developed enough to ensure better 
governance of corporations. 
The number of directors on the company‘s board 
may play a critical role in the monitoring of the board 
and in taking strategic decisions. According to the 
agency theory, there is a separation between the 
owners‘ equities (shareholders) and management 
which requires more monitoring procedures to 
regulate this relationship. Proponents of agency 
theory argue that the market for corporate control 
disciplines managers, but when there is poor 
performance that requires restructuring action, 
internal governance systems intervene before external 
market forces activate (Singh et al., 2004). Johnson et 
al., (1993) posit that boards generally prefer to 
promote firm efficiency, and hence help shareholder 
wealth preservation, before letting the market impose 
discipline on management. Increasing the number of 
the board size may increase the number of 
independent members and consequently the level of 
voluntary disclosure and reduce the dominance of the 
CEO (Mak and Roush, 2000; Singh et al., 2004; 
Yermack, 1996). Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) conclude 
that board size has a significantly negative 
relationship with market performance. 
On the other hand, some studies illustrate that 
large boards could cause more conflict between the 
members of the board which may delay critical 
decisions. In addition, large boards may weaken the 
communication and the processing of information 
(Huther, 1997; Jensen, 1993; John and Senbet, 1998). 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find that the board size 
of Singapore‘s listed companies is not associated with 
voluntary disclosure.  
In Egypt, board structure and responsibilities are 
regulated mainly by the Company Law 159/1981. 
Further enhancement of board practices within the 
framework of corporate governance is elaborated in 
the new Listing and Delisting Rules (Sourial, 2004). 
The board of directors‘ membership structure is 
dominated by the one-tier structure, and consists of an 
odd number with a minimum of three members. The 
Egyptian code of corporate governance emphasises 
heavily the role of the board and its responsibilities to 
supervise the achievement of the company‘s goal 
which leads to the company‘s success. 
Based on the above arguments, the relationship 
between the board size and IFR can be tested by the 
following hypothesis: 
H3:  There is a positive relationship between 
board size and the IFR.  
 
4.2.4 Board Independence 
Board independence is defined as ―the proportion of 
outside directors to the total number of directors‖ and 
is also known as board composition (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). Board composition can be interpreted 
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in terms of agency theory which reveals a conflict of 
interest between two groups: those who own the 
money (shareholders) and those who manage this 
money (management). The board of directors is 
expected to be the link between the two groups who 
try to alleviate this conflict. Consequently, the 
proponents embrace the agency theory which 
premises that non-executive directors should be on the 
board in large proportions in order to monitor and 
control the action of executive directors and safeguard 
the interests of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Forker (1992) confirms that the monitoring of 
management by non-executive directors makes 
management more responsive to the shareholders‘ 
interests (e.g. maximises the profits) and also more 
responsive to investors (e.g. provides more disclosed 
information), and therefore the management will be 
more in compliance with the disclosure requirements. 
Further, Gul and Leung (2004) argue that a higher 
proportion of non-executive directors will reduce the 
dominance of the chief executive officer (CEO) on the 
board.  
In contrast, opponents of having a non-executive 
majority on the board argue that non-executive 
directors do not have sufficient information about the 
activities of the company and this may restrict critical 
decisions (Goodstein et al., 1994), increase the level 
of monitoring (Baysinger and Butler, 1985) and 
finally lead to lack of real independence (Demb and 
Neubauer, 1992).  
The results of this variable are mixed. Xiao et 
al.,(2004) prove that a large proportion of independent 
directors increases both the IFR format of Chinese 
companies and the disclosure of information not 
required by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission. Based on their findings from 110 
London-listed companies, Abdelsalam et al. (2007) 
report that director independence is positively 
associated with comprehensive corporate internet 
reporting, general content and credibility. Similarly, 
Kelton and Yang (2008) find that companies with a 
higher percentage of independent directors are more 
engaged in IFR.      
In contrast to the above results, Eng and Mak 
(2003) examine the relationship between outside 
directors and the level of disclosure of Singapore 
companies. They find that the large proportion of 
outside directors decreases the level of disclosure. In 
addition, Gul and Leung (2004) provide evidence that 
independent directors are negatively associated with 
the level of voluntary disclosure. Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) find no relationship between the proportion of 
independent directors and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure of Malaysian corporations.  
In Egypt, there are no rules that govern the board 
structure being made up of executive or non-executive 
managers (Fawzy, 2003). There should be no more 
than three executive managers on the board of 
directors which mean that the majority of the board 
members are non-executive. In most companies, there 
is no actual separation between the board of directors 
and the executive management. It is a one-tier 
structure of management (ibid). 
Recently, the Egyptian corporate governance 
code stated that the board should include a majority of 
non-executive directors with highly technical and 
analytical skills who should fulfil their obligations to 
the company (Gamal El-Din, 2008). 
The following hypothesis tests the relationship 
between the proportion of independent directors and 
IFR: 
H4:  There is a positive relationship between 
the proportion of independent directors and IFR.  
 
4.2.5 Role duality                      
Role duality occurs between the CEO (chief executive 
officer) and the chairman when one person holds both 
positions at the same time. Proponents of agency 
theory advocate the separation of the two roles to 
support the essential checks and balances over 
management‘s performance (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002). Blackburn (1994) provides additional support 
for the separation of the two roles. Further, 
concentrating the power of the chairman and CEO in 
one person may create a dominant individual which 
could weaken the board‘s independence and affect the 
governance role of the board (Kelton and Yang, 
2008). 
On the other hand, proponents of stewardship 
theory deal with managers as trustworthy people who 
act in the best interests of the firm and shareholders. 
Therefore, there is no problem if the two roles are 
combined as many companies will run effectively 
with combined roles and have strong boards capable 
of providing adequate monitoring (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Heracleous, 2001). In addition, when 
the CEO is also the chairman, the effectiveness of 
performing the governing function increases as a 
result of the ability of the CEO to control board 
meetings, select agenda items and select board 
members (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  
Gul and Leung (2004) report that duality is 
negatively associated with the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Hong Kong 
companies. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) prove that 
duality is not associated with the extent of Malaysian 
companies‘ voluntary disclosure. Similarly, 
Abdelsalam et al. (2007) find no relationship between 
role duality and corporate Internet reporting. In 
addition, Kelton and Yang, (2008) conclude that role 
duality is not associated with IFR.  
In Egypt, the board chairman is often also the 
managing director. The board member responsible for 
administration is sometimes called the managing 
director or the executive director, and the board 
decides his/her remuneration (Fawzy, 2003). The 
Egyptian corporate governance code states that the 
board appoints a chairman who is preferably not the 
chief executive officer at the same time. If not 
possible, reasons should be clearly stated in the 
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annual report and in this case, the deputy chairman 
should be a non-executive. According to World Bank 
(2004, a) most of the board chairmen in Egyptian 
companies are also the chief executive officers. 
The following hypothesis tests the relationship 
between role duality and IFR: 
H5:  There is a negative relationship between 
role duality and IFR.  
 
4.2.6 Competitive pressures 
Competitive pressures are related to the threats which 
companies may encounter from the existence of new 
competitors into the market. Many studies 
demonstrate that the degree of competition faced by a 
company may encourage it to disclose more 
information (Clinch and Verrecchia, 1997; Darrough 
and Stoughton, 1990; Verrecchia, 1983). 
Competitive pressures can be viewed through 
the signalling theory, as companies are not willing to 
disclose more information in order to avoid being 
seen in a bad position when compared with their 
competitors. Hayes and Lundfiolm (1996) investigate 
the relationship between the extent of segmental 
disclosure and past return on equity as a proxy to 
competitor entrance to the market and find that there 
is a negative relationship. Moreover, Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006) examine the relationship between 
competitive costs (at both company and industry 
levels) and voluntary disclosure. They find that there 
is no association between competitive costs and the 
level of voluntary disclosure. Trabelsi and Labelle 
(2006) also conclude that there is an insignificant 
relationship between online disclosure and 
competitive pressures. The following hypothesis tests 
the relationship between competitive pressures and 
IFR: 
H6:  There is a negative relationship between 
competitive pressures and IFR. 
 
4.2.7 Type of auditor 
The type of auditor refers to the company that audits 
the financial reports of companies. Nowadays, audit 
firms are classified into two groups; Big4 audit 
companies and small (i.e. not Big4). According to 
signalling theory, the selection of a Big4 company is a 
signal to the market that the audit process is 
performed effectively and the disclosed information is 
reliable. The Big4 audit companies will influence 
companies to disclose additional information because 
they have greater skills and experience (Wallace, et 
al., 1994) and they also want to maintain their 
reputation in the market (Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
Previous studies show contradictory results for 
this variable. For instance, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
find no significant relationship between big audit 
firms and the extent of voluntary disclosure of 
information. Similarly, Malone et al. (1993) conclude 
that the type of audit firm is insignificant with regard 
to financial disclosure. On the other hand, Ahmed and 
Courtis (1999) demonstrate that a big audit firm is 
positively associated with voluntary disclosure. Xiao 
et al. (2004) conclude that Chinese companies audited 
by big audit firms have more Internet corporate 
disclosure. Kelton and Yang (2008) find that Big4 
audit companies are significantly associated with IFR.  
The audit companies responsible for auditing 
listed Egyptian companies consist of two groups: 
public agency and private companies. Public agency 
is represented in the Central Auditing Agency (CAA) 
– an independent public organisation established by 
Law 144/1988 and amended by Law 157/1998 – and 
is responsible for the auditing of state-owned 
companies by law 203/1991. On the other hand, any 
companies registered under Company Law 159/1981 
should present annual audited financial statements. 
Private agencies include any agency licensed by 
Accounting Practice Law 133/1951 that is responsible 
for auditing companies registered under Law 
159/1981.  Some of these agencies are agents for 
international auditing companies such as; Hazem 
Hassan – agents for KPMG, Mansour and Co. – 
agents for PricewaterhouseCooper (PwC), Saleh, 
Barsom, Abdel Aziz & Co. – agents for Deloitte 
Touche, and Emad Raghab – agents for Ernst & 
Young (EY). Based on the previous studies, we test 
the following hypothesis: 
H7:  There is a positive relationship between 
the type of auditor and IFR  
 
4.3  Sample and variable measurements 
 
4.3.1 Sample 
The study examines the websites of the top 100 
Egyptian listed companies in the Egyptian Exchange 
at the end of 2006. We sort all listed companies at the 
end of 2006 (595 companies) by market capitalisation 
and choose the highest 100 market capitalisation 
companies (see Appendix 2). These 100 companies 
are investigated to determine which companies have 
websites. Only 78 companies have websites (i.e. 
78%), and of these companies only 50 companies (i.e. 
64%) disclose financial information on their websites. 
As we examine only IFR, we use the 50 companies 
that disclose financial information on their website to 
investigate the determinants of IFR. 
 
4.3.2 Measurement of IFR 
IFR is measured by calculating a disclosure index 
derived from a checklist that contains 51 items. We 
classify these items into two main groups: content and 
presentation. Many studies indicate that the content 
and presentation of internet disclosure can increase 
the disclosure transparency (Hodge et al., 2004; 
Kelton and Yang, 2008). According to Ettredge et al. 
(2002), IFR can provide a complementary disclosure 
to stakeholders through disseminating alternative 
types of disclosure not required by the regulatory 
bodies. Consequently, we use 27 content items to 
measure the type of financial information disclosed on 
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the website and 24 presentation items to measure how 
information is presented on the website. These items 
are based on the literature (Debreceny et al., 2002; 
Kelton and Yang, 2008; Marston and Polei, 2004; 
Xiao et al., 2004).  
Based on Ashbaugh et al. (1999), firms are 
practising IFR if they disclose on their website (1) a 
comprehensive set of financial statements (including 
footnotes and the auditors‘ report), (2) a link to their 
annual report elsewhere on the Internet or (3) link to 
EDGAR. In addition, Ettredge et al. (2001) add some 
items to determine whether the companies disclose 
financial information on their website such as; stock 
price, press release and highlights of financial 
information. We define Egyptian listed companies as 
practising IFR if they disclose on their website (1) any 
part of their annual report (either separately or within 
the annual report), (2) any information about their 
stock price (either on the website or linked to the 
Egyptian Exchange, (3) any information about their 
dividends or press releases, and (4) any summary or 
highlights of financial information.      
Accordingly, each company‘s website is 
examined to determine whether the company 
discloses financial information. Only 50 companies 
disclose this information. After that, we re-examine 
these 50 companies to calculate the total, content and 
presentation IFR index. Each company scores 1 if the 
item in the checklist is disclosed and scores 0 
otherwise4. 
 
4.3.3 The reliability of IFR scale 
The disclosure index is a research tool which 
measures a theoretical concept that cannot be 
measured directly. Therefore, it should assess whether 
this index is reliable for the extent of IFR or not. One 
method to achieve that is by applying Cronbach‘s 
coefficient alpha. Cronbach‘s coefficient alpha 
assesses the internal consistency of IFR items by 
determining the degree to which correlation among 
IFR disclosure items is attenuated due to random error 
(Kelton and Yang, 2008; Gul and Leung, 2004) . 
There is, however, no acceptability standard for this 
reliability measure. Gul and Leung (2004) find that 
Cronbach‘s coefficient alpha for their disclosure 
index is .51, while Botosan (1997) finds it to be .64 
for her disclosure index. However, Kelton and Yang 
(2008) find Cronbach‘s coefficient alpha for the three 
categories of the IFR scale (format, content, corporate 
governance and total) to be .6, .77, .73 and .82 
respectively. As a rule of thumb, an alpha of .8 for 
widely used scales is acceptable to indicate that the 
correlations are attenuated very little by random 
measurement error (Carmines and Zeller, 1991). The 
study finds that Cronbach‘s coefficient alpha for the 
three IFR components (TOTAL, CONTENT and 
                                                 
4 The study employs an un-weighted disclosure items 
checklist to avoid a subjective view. 
PRESENTATION) are .934, .937, and .732 
respectively.  
       
4.3.4 Explanatory variables  
All the data are obtained from the Egypt Information 
Dissemination Company (EGID), the Disclosure 
Book issued by CASE in July 2007 and Kompass 
Egypt Financial Year Book 2007/2008. Table 2 
summarises the explanatory variables used in this 
study. 
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Table 2. Explanatory variables and their proxies 
 
Variables Proxies Sources 
1) Firm Characteristics 
Variables 
Size 
 
 
Natural logarithm of total assets 
 
 
Abdelsalam et al., 2007 
Type of business activity One  if the company is financial, and zero otherwise Eng & Mak, 2003 
Profitability Return on equity Kelton and Yang, 2008 
Leverage Total liabilities to total equity Xiao et al., 2004 
Competitive pressures Average return on equity over the last five years Trabelsi and Labelle, 
2006 
Type of auditor One  if the company is audited by any of the Big4 
audit companies, and zero otherwise 
Kelton and Yang, 2008 
2) Ownership structures 
variables 
Ownership diffusion 
 
 
Free float 
 
 
Marston and Polei, 
2004 
Institutional ownership Percentage of shares held by institution Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002 
3) Corporate governance 
variables 
Board size 
 
 
 
The number of board of directors members 
 
 
 
Gani and Jermias, 2006 
Board independence The ratio of non-executive members to total 
members on the board of directors 
Kelton and Yang, 2008 
Role duality One if the chairman is the same person as the CEO, 
and zero otherwise 
Kelton and Yang, 2008 
 Note: the measurement of explanatory variables 
 
4.3.5 Control Variables  
Previous studies identify many variables that have 
been tested empirically for IFR choices. We control 
for four variables, namely company size, type of 
business activity, profitability and leverage. Some 
variables such as company size are generally 
significant in prior studies (Ashbaugh et al., 1999; 
Craven and Marston, 1999; Brennan and Hourigan, 
2000; Debreceny et al., 2002; Ettredge et al., 2002; 
Oyelere et al., 2003; Marston and Polei, 2004; Xiao et 
al., 2004; Borbolla et al., 2005; Bollen et al., 2006; 
Abdelsalam et al. 2007; Kelton and Yang 2008). We 
measure company size (Size) by the natural logarithm 
of total assets on December 31, 2006.   
Other variables have mixed results. Some studies 
show that there is a significant relationship between 
online disclosure and the type of business activity 
(Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Bonson and Escobar, 2002; 
Borbolla et al., 2005; Brennan and Hourigan, 2000; 
Craven and Marston, 1999; Ismail, 2002; Oyelere et 
al., 2003), while others show an insignificant 
relationship (Debreceny and Rahman, 2005; Larran 
and Giner, 2002; Trabelsi and Labelle, 2006). We 
measure type of business activity (Type) by dummy 
variables. 
In addition, according to the signalling theory, 
only companies that achieve high profits disclose 
more information on their website to raise 
shareholders‘ confidence and reduce the risk of under-
valuation of their shares by the market. Some studies 
state that profitability is significantly associated with 
IFR (Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Debreceny and Rahman, 
2005; Ismail, 2002), while others show an 
insignificant association (Larran and Giner, 2002; 
Marston and Polei, 2004; Oyelere et al., 2003; Xiao et 
al., 2004). We measure profitability (Prof.) by return 
of equity on December 31, 2006. 
Finally, empirical studies which investigate the 
relationship between leverage and online disclosure 
are inconclusive. Some studies show a significant 
relationship (Ismail, 2002; Xiao et al., 2004), while 
others show an insignificant relationship (Bollen et 
al., 2006; Brennan and Hourigan, 2000; Debreceny et 
al., 2002; Larran and Giner, 2002; Oyelere et al., 
2003). We measure leverage (Lev) by total liability to 
total equity on December 31, 2006. 
To test the relationship between IFR and its 
determinants, we perform ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression. Three OLS regression models are 
run; the first is for TOTAL IFR, the second is for 
CONTENT IFR and the last is for PRESENTATION 
IFR. The model constructed for the three OLS 
regression models is: 
IFRI i = β0+β1Size+ β2 Type + β3 Prof+ β4 
Lev+ β5 Comp + β6 Audit + β7 Own+ β8 Ins-Own+ 
β9 B Size+ β10 B Ind+ β11 Duality + ε    
Where: 
x IFRI: IFR index      i = number of indices. 
x β0 = the intercept, 
x Size: donates company size, 
x Type: is a dummy variable for the type of 
business, 
x Prof: donates profitability, 
x Lev: donates leverage and, 
x Comp: donates competitive pressure, 
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x Audit: is a dummy variable for the type of 
audit, 
x Own: denotes the ownership diffusion, 
x Ins-own: donates institutional ownership, 
x B Size: donates the board size, 
x B Ind: donates the board independence, and 
x Duality: donates role duality. 
 
5. Data Analysis and results 
 
5.1 Descriptive results 
 
By examining the websites of the 50 Egyptian listed 
companies that disclose financial information on their 
website, we find that the quality of financial 
disclosure on the websites of the Egyptian listed 
companies is reasonably acceptable. Only 24% of the 
sampled companies disclose a full annual report on 
their website. Compared with previous studies, Xiao 
et al., (2004) find that half of their Chinese sampled 
companies disclose full annual reports on their 
websites. However, Kelton and Yang (2008) find that 
263 US companies (92.6%) disclose full annual 
reports. Most of the previous Egyptian studies do not 
examine this item except El-Dyasty (2004) who finds 
that only 11 companies (20.7%) disclose full annual 
reports and Metwaly (2003) who finds only 5 
Egyptian companies disclose full annual reports. Most 
of the disclosed annual reports are presented in PDF 
format (34%) and only 2% are in HTML. This is 
consistent with the findings of Marston and Polei 
(2004) who reveal that 44 German companies (88%) 
disclose annual reports in PDF format while only 11 
companies (22%) disclose them in HTML. 
FASB (2000) mentions that there are two types 
of format for companies to present their financial 
information: HTML and PDF. HTML is the common 
standard language to disclose information on the 
company‘s website, while PDF is a file format that 
needs special software (i.e. Adobe Acrobat Reader) to 
read and print the required information which is most 
like a traditional hard copy document. Generally, 
HTML and PDF are the most popular formats for the 
purpose of disclosing information on a company‘s 
website (FASB, 2000; Allam and Lymer, 2003). 
Acrobat files are relatively large, and may take a long 
time to download which makes some listed Egyptian 
companies break down their annual report into many 
financial statements and present them in PDF format 
to diminish the sizes of the files and thus reduce the 
time it takes to download (IASC, 1999; Allam and 
Lymer, 2002), or in HTML to allow hypertext links to 
facilitate navigation within the homepage and 
between sites (Petravick, 1999). This explains why 
listed Egyptian companies prefer to disclose some 
financial statements on their websites (e.g. balance 
sheet 56% PDF and 38% HTML and income 
statement 56% PDF and 36% HTML) rather than 
disclosing full annual reports (34% PDF and 2% 
HTML). 
The three most disclosed content items are the 
balance sheet (94%), income statement (92%) and 
previous financial statements (78%). Few companies 
disclose past dividends (12%). On the other hand, the 
three common presentation items have clear 
boundaries between annual reports and other 
information (80%), printing formats (68%) and 
graphics images (58%). Few companies use 
hyperlinks inside the annual report (2%) and 
webcasting events (2%). Table (3) summarises the 
findings of the items disclosed on the Egyptian listed 
companies.
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Table 3. The disclosure of IFR components 
 
Items N. % 
(1) Content   
1 Current annual report 12 24 
2 Last year‘s annual report 15 30 
3 Balance sheet (full or excerpt) 47 94 
4 Income statement (full or excerpt) 46 92 
5 Cash flow or funds flow statement (full or excerpt) 33 66 
6 Statement of changes in stockholders‘ equity (full or excerpt) 31 62 
7 Notes to the accounts 32 64 
8 Management report/analysis 17 34 
9 Auditor report (with or without signature) 29 58 
10 Interim report 21 42 
11 Share price history 14 28 
12 Company‘s Capital Data 33 66 
13 Share price performance in relation to stock market index 12 24 
14 Summary of key financial ratios (current or history)  26 52 
15 Summary of financial data (current or history) 30 60 
16 Segmental reporting by line of business 23 46 
17 Financial highlights/summary  26 52 
18 Industry statistics or data   13 26 
19 Past dividends    6 12 
20 Earnings or sales forecast    14 28 
21 Press release (current or history) 28 56 
22 Market share of key products    19 38 
23 Name of investor relations officer   11 22 
24 E-mail of investor relations 19 38 
25 Phone number of investor relations 12 24 
26 Postal address of investor relations   5 10 
27 Any previous financial statement 39 78 
(2) Presentation   
1 Annual report in PDF format 17 34 
2 Annual report in HTML format   1   2 
3 Balance sheet in PDF format 28 56 
4 Balance sheet in HTML format 19 38 
5 Income statement in PDF format 28 56 
6 Income statement in HTML format 36 36 
7 Cash flow or funds flow statement in PDF format 25 50 
8 Cash flow or funds flow statement in HTML format   8 16 
9 Statement of changes in stockholders‘ equity in PDF format 24 48 
10 Statement of changes in stockholders‘ equity in HTML format   6 12 
11 Hyperlinks inside the annual report   1   2 
12 Annual report in English version 18 36 
13 Any financial statement in English version 24 48 
14 Clear boundaries between the annual report and other information 40 80 
15 Change to printing-friendly format possible 34 68 
16 Privacy statement   9 18 
17 Legal statement 11 22 
18 Site Map 15 30 
19 Feedback 17 34 
20 Graphic images 29 58 
21 Flashes 26 52 
22 Sound files 7 14 
23 Video files 4 8 
24 Web casting events 1 2 
               Note: A score of 1 (if items are disclosed) and 0 (if not) 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables are provided in table (4).  
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Table 4. Descriptive analysis of both dependent and independent variables 
 
Variables Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Dependent V. 
Total 20.46 1 41 10.82 
Content 12.28 1 26 7.51 
Presentation 8.18 0 16 3.82 
Panel B:  Independent V. 
Size 6.44 4.48 7.69 .72 
Prof .24 -.47 .94 .23 
Lev 4.55 -1.45 26.51 6 
Comp .16 -.16 .58 .17 
Own .31 .005 .88 .23 
Ins-Own .33 0 1 .34 
B Size 9.12 3 15 3.04 
B Ind .76 .20 .93 .16 
Panel C: Dummy Independent V. Frequency                                       %     
Type :  Financial 
            Non financial 
30                                                     60 
20                                                     40 
Audit :    Big4 
               Not Big4 
29                                                     58 
21                                                     42 
Duality :    Role duality 
                  No role duality 
30                                                     60 
20                                                     40  
   Note: Size = company size, Type = type of business, Prof = profitability, Lev = leverage, Comp= 
competitive pressures, Audit = audit type, Own = ownership diffusion, Ins-Own= institutional ownership, B 
Size = board size, B Ind = board independent and Duality = role duality  
 
From table 4, it can be concluded that of a 
possible TOTAL score of 51, the highest score is 41 
and the lowest is 1. The mean is 20.64, indicating that 
the extent of IFR disclosure is slightly low according 
to our IFR measurement items in the checklist. The 
mean content items (12.28) tend to be disclosed more 
than the mean presentation items (8.18) which 
indicate that the Egyptian listed companies are 
concerned more with the type of information 
disclosed than the format of this information. The 
differences between the highest total score (41) and 
the lowest (1) indicate that there is a high variation in 
the type and format of information disclosed on the 
sampled companies‘ websites.  
On average, the Egyptian companies‘ board of 
directors is made up of 9 members, 76% of whom are 
independent directors, and 60% of their chairmen are 
also the CEOs of these companies. Moreover, most of 
the sampled companies are financial, audited by the 
Big4, and tend to have ownership concentration. 
However, only 33% of their shares are held by 
institutions. The multi-collinearity problem was 
checked by performing a correlation matrix and 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance values. 
Table 5 and 6 summarise these results. 
 
Table 5. Correlation matrix of independent variables 
 
 (B)  (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) 
(A) .236 .009 .551 .019 .241 .102 .090 .123 -.009 -.131 
(B)  -.385 .379 -.402 .281 .249 .196 .416 .241 -.250 
(C)   -.077 .421 .064 -.264 -.316 -.207 -.032 -.011 
(D)    -.074 -.004 -.135 .114 .029 .010 -.127 
(E)     -.228 -.091 -.255 -.217 -.134 .083 
(F)      .312 -.237 .290 -.189 -.447 
(G)       .207 .321 .019 -.214 
(H)        .335 .221 .049 
(I)         .469 -.158 
(J)          .157 
        Note: A: Size, B: Type, C: Prof, D: Lev, E: Comp, F: Audit, G: Own, H: Ins-Own, I: B Size, J: B Ind and 
K: Duality. 
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Table 6. VIF and Tolerance values for the independent variables 
 
Variables VIF Tolerance 
Size 1.675 .597 
Type 2.212 .452 
Prof 1.627 .615 
Lev 2.436 .411 
Comp 1.616 .619 
Audit 2.463 .406 
Own 1.435 .697 
Ins-Own 1.575 .635 
B Size 1.837 .545 
B Ind 1.463 .684 
Duality 1.344 .744 
Note: Size = company size, Type = type of business, Prof = profitability, Lev = leverage, Comp= 
competitive pressures, Audit = audit type, Own = ownership diffusion, Ins-Own= institutional ownership, B 
Size = board size, B Ind = board independent and Duality = role duality 
 
From table 5, we can conclude that there is no serious 
multi-collinearity between the independent variables. 
The rule of thumb for checking problems of multi-
collinearity is when the correlation coefficient is > 
0.800, (Gajarati, 2003, p.359). In addition, Table 6 
indicates that all VIF values are below 10 and 
Tolerance values are bigger than 0.1 which indicates 
that there is no multi-collinearity between the 
Independent variables (Field, 2009). 
 
5.2 Multivariate analysis results 
 
For the multivariate analysis, we run three regressions 
models, one for each of the three dependent variables 
(TOTAL, CONTENT and PRESENTATION)5. All 
three models are significant at p < .0001. The results 
for the three models are summarised in table 6.  
                                                 
5 The normality test was performed using 
Skewness/Kurtosis test which is summarised in Appendix 3. 
The leverage and board independence are not normally 
distributed. Therefore, following Abdelsalam et al., (2007); 
Abdelsalam and Street, (2007); Lang and Lundholm  
(1993); Wallace and Naser, (1995), the non-normality 
variables were transformed into ranks before running the 
regression model. 
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Table 6. OLS results of the association between corporate governance, firm characteristics and IFR       
 
Dependent V.  Exp. 
Sign 
Coef.          T Statistic Coef.          T Statistic Coef.          T Statistic 
Total Content Presentation 
CONSTANT    -.530*** -2.666 -.684*** -2.838 -.357** -1.987 
Size + .110*** 3.207 .143*** 3.452 .072** 2.331 
Type +/- -.095* -1.665 -.196*** -2.815 .017 .334 
Prof + .187* 1.744 .175 1.347 .202** 2.067 
Lev - -.001 -.247 -.002 -.342 .000 -.066 
Comp - -.159 -1.099 -.222 -1.272 -.087 -.664 
Audit + .115* 1.916 .180** 2.478 .042 .766 
Own + .443*** 4.427 .616*** 5.080 .248*** 2.743 
Ins-Own +/- -.095** -2.009 -.124** -2.151 -.063 -1.477 
B Size + .010 1.212 .008 .820 .012* 1.613 
B Ind + .056 -.384 .055 .312 .057 -.431 
Duality - -.016 -.350 -.014 -.249 -.018 -.448 
P value  0.000  0.000  0.000  
F-Ratio 7.731 9.635 4.284 
 
60.2 % 66% 42.4 % 
             Note: *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Our findings support hypothesis H1 for all the 
three models. Contrary to Abdelsalam et al., (2007) 
and Trabelsi and Labelle (2006), who find no 
relationship between ownership diffusion and online 
disclosure, this study finds that the more diffusion in 
the ownership structure, the more engagement for the 
Egyptian companies in IFR. This explains the 
advantages of using the Internet as an additional tool 
to reach widely-spread owners, which reduces the 
owners‘ information costs and in turn supports the 
shareholders in monitoring the management 
behaviour (Oyelere et al., 2003). This result is 
confirmed by Marston and Polei (2004), who examine 
the relationship between ownership diffusion and IFR 
for two samples in 2000 and 2003. The study 
demonstrates that ownership diffusion is positively 
related to IFR (TOTAL, CONTENT and 
PRESENTATION) only for the sample of 2000. In 
addition, Oyelere et al. (2003) mention that the spread 
of ownership is positively associated with IFR. 
Pirchegger and Waganhofer (1999) investigate the 
relationship between the online disclosure and free 
float (as a proxy for ownership diffusion) for two 
samples: Austrian and German companies. The study 
demonstrates that free float is only significant for the 
online disclosure of the Austrian companies.        
For hypothesis H2, we expect a significant 
relationship between institutional ownership and IFR. 
Our results support this inference as we find that 
institutional ownership in the Egyptian companies has 
a negative effect on IFR. One reason for this is the 
desire of these institutions to disclose less information 
on the companies‘ websites to be in a more 
advantageous position than their competitors. These 
institutions have already the required information 
about their companies as they share in the ownership 
structure of these companies. Our findings are 
consistent with Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) who 
find a negative association between institutional 
ownership and disclosure. In addition, Sriram and 
Laksmana (2006) demonstrate that companies with 
more institutional investors disclose fewer items on 
their websites. Moreover, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
find a negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure, but 
this relationship is insignificant. 
Our findings support hypothesis H3 that board 
size has a significant association with IFR. We find 
that increased members on the board of directors 
increase the PRESENTATION of the disclosed 
information on the companies‘ websites. Many ideas 
about how to disclose financial information on the 
website may be discussed when there are a large 
number of board members. Dallas (2003) argues that 
a larger board size brings more resources to firms and 
therefore might improve their performance, which is 
reflected in the improvement of disclosure level. Our 
result is consistent with Abdel-Fattah, (2007) who 
claims that the larger the size of the board, the more 
likely the voluntary disclosure. Moreover, Gani and 
Jermias (2006) find that board size is positively 
related to the performance of the firm which increases 
the disclosed information. However, no evidence is 
provided to support the relationship between board 
size and TOTAL and CONTENT. This is supported 
by Cheng and Courtenay (2006) who find that board 
size has an insignificant association with the level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
For hypothesis H7, we find that Egyptian 
companies that are audited by the Big4 audit 
companies disclose more financial information on 
their website. In addition, we find that audit type is 
positively related to CONTENT of the disclosed 
information. This is due to the confidence that the 
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Big4 audit companies provide to the users of the 
financial statements, as well as the pressure that these 
companies bring to bear on Egyptian companies to 
disclose more information. This finding is consistent 
with (Kelton and Yang, 2008) who find that audit 
type is positively associated with the US IFR 
measures (TOTAL and CONTENT). Similarly, Xiao 
et al. (2004) find that audit firms increase the level of 
IFR for voluntary disclosure items. The results of 
Craswell and Taylor (1992) and Inchausti (1997) also 
support a positive relationship between audit type and 
the level of disclosure. 
For our control variables, we find that size is 
associated positively with TOTAL, CONTENT and 
PRESENTATION. The reason for this is that large 
Egyptian companies have the motivation and 
resources for disclosing more information on their 
websites. Moreover, large companies are 
characterised with large outside equity that requires 
disclosing more information on their websites to hold 
their existing shareholders and also attract new ones. 
This result is consistent with most of the previous 
studies. Kelton and Yang (2008), Marston and Polei 
(2004) and Xiao et al. (2004) find a positive 
relationship between size and online disclosure. 
In addition, the study finds that non financial 
companies are more likely to disclose different types 
of financial information than financial ones. Also, it 
finds that non-financial companies are more engaged 
in the TOTAL IFR than financial ones.  This is not a 
surprising result as the content of the disclosed 
information on Egyptian companies‘ websites varies 
on a large scale for the non-financial companies that 
provide additional financial information for their 
investors (such as: share price history, dividends, 
some financial highlights, etc.), while most financial 
companies provide only financial statements with no 
supplemental information. This result is consistent 
with Debreceny and Rahman (2005), who investigate 
the relationship between industry class (financial and 
non-financial) and the frequency of continuous online 
disclosure in eight developed markets in Asia and 
Europe. They find that in France, the non-financial 
sector continuously discloses their information online 
more than that of financial sectors. Moreover, Bonson 
and Escobar (2002) conclude that companies in 
resources and industrial sectors seem to disclose more 
information than companies in financial and 
technological sectors. Although Eng and Mak (2003) 
find that non-financial companies disclose more 
information on their website than financial 
companies, the relationship was insignificant. Our 
results show no relationship between business type 
and PRESENTATION. This is confirmed by Craven 
and Marston (1999) and Larran and Giner (2002) who 
find no effect of industry type in IFR. 
Moreover, we find an evidence of a positive 
relationship between profitability and both TOTAL 
and PRESENTATION. This is because of the 
awareness of the profitable Egyptian companies to 
present themselves to different stakeholders by 
disclosing more information on their website. 
Profitable companies tend to show the ―good image‖ 
of their companies to attract more stakeholders to 
invest in these companies. This result is consistent 
with Ashbaugh et al. (1999) who find that profitable 
US companies are more engaged in IFR. In addition, 
Debreceny and Rahman (2005) conclude that there is 
a positive relationship between profitability and 
higher frequencies of continuous online disclosure. 
Hannifa and Cooke (2002) also find a positive 
relationship between profitability and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. However, we find no significant 
relationship between profitability and CONTENT. 
This result is consistent with Marston and Polei 
(2004) who find no association between profitability 
and CONTENT.   
The study also finds no significant relationship 
between IFR (TOTAL, CONTENT, and 
PRESENTATION) and board independent (H4), role 
duality (H5), competitive pressure (H6), and leverage.  
 
6. Conclusion, limitation and future 
research                  
 
This study extends the previous studies by examining 
the effect of corporate governance and ownership 
structure on the IFR of the top 100 Egyptian listed 
companies. To the best of the authors‘ knowledge, 
there is no previous study in the Egyptian 
environment which investigates the relationship 
between corporate governance and online disclosure. 
This study seeks to fill the gap in this area. The 
descriptive results indicate that Egyptian listed 
companies should improve their disclosure quality by 
disseminating full annual reports on their websites.  
Our OLS regression models indicate that firm size 
and ownership diffusion are positively associated with 
the three dependent variables (TOTAL, CONTENT 
and PRESENTATION). Consistent with previous 
studies, we find that profitability is positively 
associated with TOTAL and PRESENTATION, audit 
type is positively related to TOTAL and CONTENT. 
However, institutional ownership is negatively 
associated with TOTAL and CONTENT. Type of 
business activity is significantly related to TOTAL 
and CONTENT. Finally, we find that board size 
positively influences PRESENTATION.  
As a result of globalisation, dramatic changes 
have been happening in the stock market of 
developing countries. Foreign investors are allowed to 
invest in the domestic stock market (Bekaert and 
Harvey, 2000). Many reasons have hindered investors 
from investing in emerging markets, among them a 
lack of corporate governance and transparency (Banz 
and Clough, 2002; Gibson, 2003; World Bank, 2004). 
In a similar vein, Hodge et al. (2004) mention that 
investor decisions are affected by the variation in the 
transparency of IFR. Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (2002) requires companies to increase their level 
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of financial information transparency and enhance 
their disclosure quality by commitment to corporate 
governance rules. Consequently, corporate 
governance rules may affect the usage of IFR which 
becomes an important request from investors in order 
to obtain timely financial information, and can 
improve disclosure transparency by both the content 
and presentation format of internet disclosure (Kelton 
and Yang, 2008).         
Therefore, it is important for the emerging 
markets (e.g. Egypt) to be more aware of the 
importance of corporate governance and timely 
disclosure provided by IFR to protect investor‘s 
interests and satisfy their information needs. The 
Internet enables Egyptian companies to increase their 
communication with investors by providing unique 
presentation tools that are not available in a traditional 
paper-based disclosure, which increases the frequency 
of disclosed information (Ashbaugh et al. 1999; 
FASB, 2000). In addition, as a result of the 
voluntarily nature of online disclosure, there will be a 
flexibility in the content of disclosed information on 
the Egyptian companies‘ websites. This makes IFR an 
important research area in the Egyptian context.    
Examining the relationship between IFR and 
corporate governance is a fundamental research 
problem the findings of which may provide empirical 
evidence to many parties. From a company 
perspective, the importance of disclosing financial 
information via the Internet for investors may 
encourage Egyptian companies to determine the key 
factors which impact on IFR – especially corporate 
governance. Providing timely and accurate 
information via companies‘ websites will attract more 
investors to invest in these companies which in turn 
will increase the market value of their stocks and thus 
lower their cost of capital.     
From the policy-makers‘ perspective, the 
importance of disclosing timely and accurate 
information to realise transparency demands great 
attention in the Egyptian context. One way to achieve 
this will be by enhancing corporate governance 
practice and organising its application. Ajinkya et al. 
(2005) state that ―promoting stronger governance 
could also promote more transparent disclosure‖. If 
corporate governance characteristics influence IFR, 
regulatory changes may be required to improve 
transparency.  
From the academic perspective, the findings may 
explain IFR and its key determinants in one of the 
developing countries, namely Egypt. Moreover, the 
findings will clarify the current practice of IFR in the 
Egyptian environment as well as the application of 
corporate governance rules. This in turn will make 
these findings more useful for future researches in the 
area of emerging markets – especially Middle East 
countries that have similarities to the Egyptian 
environment.    
In evaluating the results, some limitations should 
be considered. The sample of the study   is slightly 
small as the study uses only the top 100 active 
companies in the Egyptian Exchange. Future research 
may extend this sample. However, the top 100 active 
companies constitute approximately 75% of the total 
market capitalisation of the EGX, and 70% and 66% 
of the trading value and volume respectively (EGX, 
2007). Therefore, the results obtained from this study 
can be generalised on the rest of the Egyptian 
companies. Moreover, EGX is correlated with some 
developed and developing countries. It correlates 
positively with the Malaysia Stock Exchange (70%), 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (28%), DAX (47%), FTSE 
(49%), S&P (47%), Saudi Arabia Stock Exchange 
(15%) and the Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange (14%) 
(CMA, July, 2007). This indicates that these results 
may have an echo effect in either the developed or 
developing countries. Meric et al. (2007) studied 
relationships between the co-movements of four 
major Middle East stock markets and the US and UK 
stock markets. They indicate that the correlation 
coefficient reveals that US and UK investors can 
obtain the best diversification benefits by investing in 
the Egyptian stock market. In addition, many studies 
demonstrate that Arab and Middle East countries have 
a similar characteristic either in their accounting or in 
their corporate governance systems (Sourial, 2004; 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; Omran et al., 2008) 
which reflects the possibility of generalising the 
results of this study with the other Arab and Middle 
East countries.  
The study examines only three variables of 
corporate governance, namely; board independence, 
board size and role duality. Future research may 
examine the effect of the addition of variables such as 
family and foreign members on the board of directors. 
Finally, the study mainly concentrates on the 
disclosure of financial information on the Egyptian 
companies‘ websites. Future research may examine 
the disclosure of other types of information such as 
social and corporate governance information.   
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Appendix 1. Overview of the descriptive IFR studies 
 
Study Sample % type of presentation %corporate web 
site 
 
% financial data 
on site 
Louwers et al., 1996, 
USA 
150 Fortune 500 N/A 
 
65 
 
37 
 
Petravick and Gillet, 
1996, USA 
150 Fortune 500 N/A 69 55 
Lymer and Tallberg, 
1997,  
UK  
Finland 
 
 
 
Top 50 com. 
Top 72 com. 
N/A 92 (for UK 
companies) 
90 for (Finnish 
companies)  
52 (for UK 
companies 
82 for (Finnish 
companies) 
Petravick and Gillet, 
1998, USA 
Top 125 com. N/A 96 79 
Hussey and Sowinska, 
1999, UK 
FTSE 100  N/A 91 63 
Petravick, 1999, USA 150 Fortune 500 N/A 95 93 
Gowthorpe and Amat, 
1999, Spain 
379 listed com. N/A 19 56 
Hedlin, 1999, Sweden 
 
60 listed com. Hyperlink 10 
Multilane. 80 
Graphics   27 
98 83 
FASB, 2000, USA Fortune 100 U.S.  HTML  77 
PDF    61 
Word  12 
99 93 
Holm, 2000, Denmark 231 listed com. HTML 
PDF 
Other format 
78 56 
Poon et al., 2003, 
Hong Kong 
Top100 listed com.  94 87 
Pervan, 2005, Croatia 
 
38 listed com. HTML 18 
PDF    37 
XLS     5 
100 53 
         Note: summary of the previous descriptive studies between 1996 and 2005 
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Appendix 2. The top 100 listed Egyptian companies 
 
Company 
 
Web site Market 
Cap(000) 
Orascom Telecom Holding (OT)) www.orascomtelecom.com  83017000 
Orascom Construction Industries (OCI) www.orascomci.com 55266061 
Telecom Egypt www.telecomegypt.com 24274558 
Vodafone Egypt Telecommunications www.vodafone.com.eg 22723200 
Egyptian Company for Mobile services (MobiNil) www.mobinil.com.eg 18139000 
Egyptian Financial Group-Hermes Holding Company  www.efg-hermes.com 15630919 
EL Ezz Aldekhela Steel - Alexandria N/A 13166980 
Sidi Kerir Petrochemicals www.sidpec.com 11955300 
Suez Cement N/A 11898871 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) www.cibeg.com 11284650 
Egyptian Iron  Steel www.iron-steel.com.eg 10534922 
El Ezz Steel Rebars www.ezzindustries.com 9629734 
National Societe Generale Bank (NSGB) www.nsgb.com.eg 9117673 
Orascom Hotels And Development www.orascomhd.com 8362139 
Egyptian Kuwaiti Holding www.ekholding.com 7858154 
Eastern Tobacco www.easternegypt.com 7750000 
GB AUTO www.ghabbourauto.com 7380090 
Egypt Aluminium www.egyptalum.com.eg 6752500 
Alexandria Mineral Oils Company www.amocalex.com 6735603 
Abou Kir Fertilizers www.abuqir.com 6479158 
El-Swedy Cables www.elsewedycables.com 5199600 
Credit Agricole Egypt www.eab-online.com 4653085 
Fertilized Egypt Co. N/A 4226937 
Six of October Development  Investment (SODIC) www.sodic.com.eg 3871223 
Asek Company for Mining - Ascom N/A 3649777 
Egyptian for Tourism Resorts www.sahlhasheesh.com 3305138 
Torah Cement www.mideastnet.com/mining/tourah.htm 3246245 
Oriental Weavers www.orientalsgroup.com 3218000 
Olympic Group Financial Investments www.olympicgroup.com 3192427 
National Cement www.ncc-eg.com 3010344 
Pharco Pharmaceuticals N/A 2745000 
Delta Sugar www.deltasugar.com 2730224 
Amoun www.amoun.com 2523000 
El Watany Bank of Egypt www.alwatany.net 2513250 
National Navigation www.nnc.egnet.net 2443582 
Naeem Holding www.naeemholding.com 2320032 
Egyptian Gulf Bank www.egbbank.com.eg 2202230 
Misr Beni Suef Cement www.mbsc-co.com/index2.html 2200600 
South Valley Cement N/A 2193196 
Canal Shipping Agencies www.canalshipping.net 2154000 
Sinai Cement N/A 2111900 
Lecico Egypt www.lecicoegypt.com 2086400 
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Arab Cotton Ginning N/A 2005434 
Egyptian Media Production City www.empc.com.eg 1950480 
Heliopolis Housing www.heliopoliscompany.com 1949669 
Egyptian International Pharmaceuticals (EIPICO) www.eipico.com.eg 1893976 
Delta Industries (IDEAL) www.tortp.gov.eg/fac/ideal/index.html 1816168 
Misr Cement (Qena) www.qenacement.com 1800000 
Medinet Nasr Housing www.mnhd.net 1760160 
Ameriyah Cement N/A 1704000 
Alexandria Spinning  Weaving (SPINALEX) www.spinalex.com/spinalex/home.htm 1691343 
Export Development Bank  www.edbebank.com 1440000 
Orascom Hotel Holdings (OHH) www.elgouna.com 1296937 
El Nasr Clothes  Textile (KABO) www.kabo.com.eg 1222393 
Assiut Cement www.cemex.com.eg 1137141 
Natural Gas  Mining Project (Egypt Gas) www.egyptgas.com.eg 1080000 
Alexandria Containers and Goods www.alexcont.com 1074774 
Egyptian Saudi Finance Bank www.esf-bank.com 1055000 
Exxon Mobil (Egypt) www.exxonmobil.com/corporate 953581 
Egyptian Financial  Industrial  www.sfie.com.eg 942069 
Paint  Chemicals Industries (Pachin) www.pachin.com/insidetest.htm 934000 
Medical Union Pharmaceuticals N/A 762156 
Housing  Development  Bank www.hdb.egy.com 760433 
Egyptian Starch  Glucose N/A 727625 
Cairo Poultry N/A 721224 
Alexandria Cement N/A 720000 
Amreyah Pharmaceuticals Industries N/A 702000 
Sharm Dreams Co. for Tourism Investment N/A 686800 
PIRAEUS Bank Egypt www.nbo.com 685059 
Raya Holding For Technology And Communication www.rayacorp.com 666722 
Omar Effindi N/A 655010 
Suez Canal Bank www.scbank.com.eg 653000 
Misr Conditioning (Miraco) www.miraco.com.eg 644850 
Alexandria Real Estate www.al-rabwa.com 576164 
Blom Bank Egypt www.blombankegypt.com/en/index.aspx 575000 
Arab Polvara Spinning  Weaving Co. N/A 569614 
Beni Suef Cement www.mideastnet.com/mining/benisuif.htm 544560 
El Nasr Transformers (El Maco) www.elmaco-egypt.com.eg 535927 
National Development Bank www.nbdegypt.com 500127 
Quena Paper Industry www.qpicpaper.com 500005 
Namaa for Development And Real Estate Investment 
Co. 
www.namaa-tower.com 479074 
El Ezz Porcelain (Gemma) www.gemma.com.eg 398884 
Egyptian Chemical Industries (KIMA) www.kimaegypt.com 382960 
Arab Banking Corporation -Egypt (Less right) www.arabbanking.com 381809 
Egyptian Contracting (Mokhtar Ibrahim) www.moukhtar.com 368520 
United Housing  Development N/A 368452 
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Misr Chemical Industries www.mci-egypt.com/ 368320 
El Shams Housing  Urbanization www.elshams.com 354560 
El Ahli Investment And Development www.adi-alahly.com 348000 
Pyramisa Hotels www.pyramisaegypt.com 314051 
Remco for Touristic Construction www.remcostella.com/experience.html 310735 
Zahraa Maadi Investment  Development www.zahraa-elmaadi.com 305500 
Mansour  Maghraby Investment  Development www.mm-id.com 290000 
Nile Cotton Ginning N/A 280860 
Egyptian Electrical Cables www.ece.com.eg 252153 
National Housing for Professional syndicate N/A 239040 
Rowad Misr Tourism Investment N/A 226940 
National company for Maize Products N/A 201080 
El Kahera Housing N/A 165900 
United Arab Shipping www.arload.com.eg 163236 
 
 
Appendix 3. Normality Test 
 
                   Skewness                     Kurtosis 
 Statistic Std. Error Z-Value  Statistic Std. Error Z-Value  
Ci 0.548202 0.336601 1.628642 -0.93103 0.661908 -1.406577 
Pi -0.03643 0.336601 -0.108228 -0.5087 0.661908 -0.768542 
Total i 0.356425 0.336601 1.058897 -0.93901 0.661908 -1.418641 
Size -0.61312 0.336601 -1.821492 0.556217 0.661908 0.840324 
Type  0.420985 0.336601 1.250694 -1.90049 0.661908 -2.871225 
Prof 0.273611 0.336601 0.812865 2.870932 0.661908 4.337355 
Lev 2.025522 0.336601 6.017582 4.497649 0.661908 6.794973 
Audit -0.33429 0.336601 -0.993135 -1.9687 0.661908 -2.974273 
Comp 0.641576 0.336601 1.906044 0.197985 0.661908 0.299113 
Own 0.646152 0.336601 1.91964 -0.12861 0.661908 -0.194296 
B Size 0.264273 0.336601 0.785124 -0.74349 0.661908 -1.123248 
Duality -0.42098 0.336601 -1.250694 -1.90049 0.661908 -2.871225 
B Ind -1.72128 0.336601 -5.113706 3.383595 0.661908 5.111878 
Ins-Own 0.77955442 0.33660071 2.315962 -0.76965951 0.66190837 -1.162789 
Note Z-value Skewness = Statistics/Std.error, Z-value Kurtosis = Statistics/Std.error 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND SPAIN: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
Guadalupe del Carmen Briano Turrent*, Eva Argente Linares**, María Victoría López 
Pérez***, Lázaro Rodríguez Ariza****  
 
Abstract 
Based on institutional theory, this study presents a comparative analysis of the regulatory framework 
for corporate governance to be found in the most important emerging markets in Latin America 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico), which represent most of the stock market capitalization in the 
region. In addition, we analyzed the situation of Spain, representing the European economy, given this 
country’s strong investment presence in the Latin American stock market.  The aims of the study are:  
1) to extend the current literature related to corporate governance in Spain and emerging Latin 
American economies; 2) to highlight the evolution of the institutional and regulatory framework for 
corporate governance in these countries; and 3) to compare the diverse regulatory framework, with 
particular focus on the laws and corporate governance codes in the above mentioned countries. 
Despite the trend for international convergence of corporate governance systems toward the Anglo-
Saxon model, both in legislation and in good governance codes, there are significant differences 
between countries. The present convergence is promoted by different institutions; systems differ, thus, 
in their implementation and application of good governance practices. The countries in question have 
adopted a hybrid model based, on the one hand, on laws and decrees, and on the other, on the 
voluntary adoption of codes of good governance. The aim of these measures is to enhance investor 
protection, to define the functions of the Board and of the Audit Committee, and to improve 
transparency, especially regarding conflicts of interest, related party transactions and corporate risk 
for listed companies. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that Argentina, Brazil and Chile 
have strengthened their legislation in the case of minority investor protection and market 
transparency (Circular No. 3531 in Argentina, Law No. 10303 in Brazil and the Take-over Law in 
Chile). On the other hand, Mexico and Spain have issued regulations focused on transparency 
information (the Transparency Law in Spain and the CUE Circular in Mexico). Codes of good 
governance have been adopted by all countries except Chile, which bases its corporate governance on 
the OPAs (Take-over bids) Act. The practices addressed in corporate governance codes are focused on 
the Board, whose main function is to monitor and supervise management performance. These codes 
contain a set of recommended practices defining the functions, structure, composition and creation of 
different committees that support the Board, together with aspects related to COB-CEO duality. Spain 
and Chile are the countries that have adopted most such practices. The audit function is another 
important corporate governance dimension in the codes, concerning the role, liabilities and 
composition of the Audit Committee. This body is responsible for ensuring full and transparent 
disclosure of company transactions. Mexico is the country that pays most attention to the audit 
function. Practices relating to the general meeting, disclosure, conflicts of interest and Board support 
committees are established in all governance codes, especially in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.  
Keywords: Corporate governance, institutional transparency, Latin America, Spain, emerging 
markets 
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